

APPEAL NO. 032081  
FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on July 9, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the compensable injury does not extend to or include the right wrist (carpal tunnel syndrome) and both elbows (cubital tunnel syndrome). The hearing officer also determined that the appellant (claimant) did not have disability from the \_\_\_\_\_ injury from October 1, 2002, through March 5, 2003. The claimant has appealed on factual sufficiency grounds and urges reversal. The respondent (carrier) has responded and urges affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The issues of extent of injury and disability are questions of fact. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the hearing officer's resolution of the issues before her.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEM  
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

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Gary L. Kilgore  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Judy L. S. Barnes  
Appeals Judge

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Chris Cowan  
Appeals Judge